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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering Progresa program in Mexico in the late 1990s, cash transfers programs have been
extensively used in the developing world, especially in Latin America, as a way to improve human capital
accumulation and to break inter-generational cycles of poverty. In general, those programs have improved
educational and health outcomes and, long-term human capital accumulation, and have promoted short-
term reductions in poverty (Lagarde et al., 2007; Fiszbein et al., 2009, for a review). However, they can
also have impacts on fertility decisions. An early theoretical literature suggests, there may be a substitute
relation between quantity and quality of children in fertility decisions (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Cochrane,
1975; Schultz, 1997; Stecklov et al., 2007) and, depending on its design, a cash transfer program can affect
this trade-off. A conditional cash transfer program imposes minimal school attendance and periodic visits
to health officials, thus reducing the child “quality” price. An unconditional cash transfer, as the name
suggests, does not have any kind of condition attached to the grant, but can still affect fertility decisions
through an income effect. Here, we investigate whether the Brazilian cash transfer program Bolsa Famı́lia
(BF), through both its conditional and unconditional components, encouraged beneficiary women to have
children during the 2012-2015 period and whether it affected birth spacing, using the 2011 BF’ allocation
rules. This research evaluates exogenous variation in fertility by employing the eligibility rule used by the
Brazilian government to authorize BF’ payments. The data, however, is self-reported and self-updated by
current and potential beneficiaries, so it has potential measurement errors as results of heaping, attrition and
manipulation. Income is subject to heaping so manipulation tests may falsely find evidence of manipulation
in heaping values (Barreca et al., 2016). Therefore, we applied our analysis on non-heaping observations,
which is similar to a donut regression discontinuity approach. This solves the problem of heaping but not
of attrition. By applying a non-parametric approach suggested by Gerard et al. (2020) in a subset of the
observations, it is possible to identify bounds on the treatment effects, even under attrition of the data.
We found no effect on fertility rates, but a large and significant effect on reducing birth spacing was found.
While RD estimations for fertility rates are stable (i.e., we are able to identify the ATE through the LATE),
the birth spacing findings are not. This study is divided as follows: section 2 discusses the economic theory
behind cash transfers and fertility and gives a background on BF. Section 3 describes the data and its
measurement problems. Sections 4 and 5 provide the empirical framework and results, and sections 6 and 7
the robustness and external validity of our results. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
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2 Background
2.1 Income, Fertility and Cash Transfers
The relation between family size and income is widely studied in the social sciences. It is observed that
within a country there is a negative association between family size and children’s schooling (Hanushek,
1992; Gupta and da Costa Leite, 1999; Cleland, 2002; Schultz, 2005). In the macroeconomic literature, the
negative relationship between income and population growth in modern history is extensively documented
and analyzed (Barro and Becker, 1989; Robinson, 1997; Galor and Weil, 2000; Doepke, 2004; Angrist et al.,
2010). To explain such observations, many mechanisms have been proposed, such as the trade-off between
child quality and quantity (Becker et al., 1990; Moav, 2004); higher wages for women, which increase the
opportunity costs of child rearing (Galor and Weil, 1996; Momota, 2000); the change of net flow of transfers
from parents to children as an economy grows (Caldwell, 1976); and the technological progress that brings an
increase in the return of education, thus triggering demographic transition (Galor and Weil, 2000). In general
these macroeconomic studies have supported the view that, over several generations, large families reduce
living standards. However, it is the traditional Becker and Lewis model (1973), which also gave birth to an
extensive related literature (Cochrane, 1975; Robinson, 1997), that provides the basic mechanism for policy
makers to reduce family size within a lifetime to foster economic development (Angrist et al., 2010). Those
policies include cash transfer programs. Basically, in the Becker and Lewis (1973) framework, parents choose
both quantity and quality of children but there is a substitution relation between them, and the consumption
of one of these goods increases the shadow price of the other. Depending on its design, a cash transfer
program can affect this trade-off (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Stecklov et al., 2007). Conditional cash transfers
(CCTs) and unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) distribute cash to poor households to alleviate their income
restraints, but the difference is that UCTs give cash with no strings attached, while CCT programs give cash
contingent on certain behaviors that improve the household’s human capital accumulation, such as minimal
school attendance by the children and periodic visits to health centers (Lagarde et al., 2007; Fiszbein et al.,
2009; Baird et al., 2014). The main argument for UCTs is that the key constraint for poor people is simply
a lack of money. For CCTs, the argument involves the existence of market failures that cause suboptimal
levels of education and also the view that redistribution policies should encourage socially desirable behaviors
so they are more palatable to taxpayers (Baird et al., 2011, 2014). In summary, UCTs produce an income
effect, and CCTs add an alteration to the relative price of schooling and health services. The final result
is ambiguous: with more income, parents may improve their children’s education and consume more health
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services (provided those are normal goods), but at same time, they may want another child. For instance,
Willis (1973) shows that a decrease in the quality price may increase fertility if quality and quantity are
complements. Further, CCTs and UCTs usually transfer an amount per children, so additional children can
be perceived by the recipient as an extra source of income. The trade-off mechanism, however, has seen mixed
evidence in empirical studies. On one hand, Angrist et al. (2010) found no evidence of the mechanism in
Israel, and signs of increased fertility were not encountered in the majority of CCTs and UCTs analyzed in the
developing world (Fiszbein et al., 2009), such as those implemented in Mexico or Nicaragua (Schultz, 2004;
Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Stecklov et al., 2007; Todd et al., 2012), South Africa (Bor, 2013), Zambia (Palermo
et al., 2016), Brazil (da Rocha, 2010; Signorini et al., 2011; Simões and Soares, 2012; Olson et al., 2019),
or Argentina (Garganta et al., 2017), the exception being Honduras (Stecklov et al., 2007). On the other
hand, pro-natal policies in some developed countries that aim to reduce child rearing costs seem to increase
fertility, as found by Hoem (1990) in Sweden, Laroque and Salanié (2008) in France, Cohen et al. (2013)
in Israel, and Zhang et al. (1994); Milligan (2005) in Canada. Although differences between programs may
explain the findings,1 it is possible that positive effects may be capturing a confounding effect. Alleviating
restraints may anticipate births that parents were planning in the future, so reduced-form evidence can
mistakenly indicate an effect on fertility. Many studies have a time period that restrains the possibility of
capturing reductions in birth spacing, and thus an analysis that occurs within a restricted period might not
fully capture lifetime impacts on fertility2 (Todd et al., 2012; Kim, 2014). Some possibilities for controlling
for this effect are larger time periods (Zhang et al., 1994; Kim, 2014), right censoring models (Todd et al.,
2012), and dynamic structural models (Todd and Wolpin, 2006). Most of these studies points to no effects
of financial incentives on fertility (Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Todd et al., 2012; Kim, 2014).
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the available data allows us to
analyze fertility outcomes as births occurring in a relatively large window, and also the timing between
them. Analyzing birth spacing allow us to identify possible confounding effects in the fertility outcomes, and
is also a point of policy interest. Very short or very long periods between births may negatively affect both
the health of the newborn child and the mother, but in general, longer periods improve their health. That is,
the effect of large birth spacing on health is a parabola (Conde-Agudelo et al., 2006, 2007; DaVanzo et al.,
2007; Conde-Agudelo et al., 2012; Todd et al., 2012; Wendt et al., 2012). Furthermore, spacing decisions may
be affected by economic context. On one hand, greater spacing may be optimal in smoothing consumption
1For instance, the financial incentives might be relatively larger in developed economies.
2Conditional cash transfer programs such as those in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua were analyzed during the controlled
trial phase, which lasts for no more than a couple of years.
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where credit markets are imperfect, but on the other, spreading out births can be costly when economies of
scale exist in raising children (Heckman and Willis, 1976; Schultz, 1997; Todd et al., 2012).
Second, as opposed to comparable programs, BF did not start with a controlled trial, which makes effect
analysis difficult due to omitted variable bias. Adding to the literature studying the Brazilian case,3 we use
data from the federal institution responsible for BF’s allocation so that we can direct observe beneficiaries
and non-beneficiaries. Additionally, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD), a quasi-experimental
approach that is the closest to a randomized experiment in terms of reliability in estimating unbiased
treatment effects (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, 2014). Third, the quality-quantity trade-off is a concept that still
guides both policy makers and the general population in cash transfer discussions, particularly in the case
of unintended fertility (Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Stecklov et al., 2007; Angrist et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2014;
Palermo et al., 2016). Additional evidence is important for this debate, since it can strengthen or weaken
arguments of cash transfers’ effects on fertility. The next section presents characteristics of the program and
the data.
2.2 The Brazilian Program Bolsa Famı́lia
Bolsa Famı́lia was created in 2003, based on the merge of four earlier smaller-scale poverty-alleviating
programs. Within three years, BF covered around 11 million families, becoming the largest CCT program
in the world at that time. In 2009, the program was authorized to expand to around 12.4 million families
(Lindert et al., 2007; Soares et al., 2010). For a family to be eligible, it must have a per capita income below
a certain cutoff, which the government usually changes on a yearly basis, as shown in Table 1. Beneficiaries
can then receive a basic grant and also a variable grant that depends on the number of children and their
ages. Eligibility for each type of grant is divided into two categories based on income: extreme poverty and
poverty. Only those in the first category receive the basic amount. The basic grant is unconditional, while
the variable benefits have some sort of condition.
From 2011 to 2015, a family could claim up to five variable benefits. These variable benefits fell into three
categories: pregnant, nursing, and 0–15 years old. The pregnancy benefit is given to families with pregnant
women aged 14 to 44 years. The nursing benefit is given to families with infants from birth to six months
of age, with each child corresponding to one benefit. Finally, the 0-15 years old benefit is given to families
with children under the age of 15. Not subject to the five-benefit cap, there is a benefit for older teenagers,
3da Rocha (2010); Signorini et al. (2011); Simões and Soares (2012); Olson et al. (2019) used cross-sectional data provided
by the Brazilian IBGE (National Institute of Geography and Statistics) which can be used to indirectly extract treatment and
control groups.
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a benef́ıcio variável ao adolescente (BVJ). Families with teenagers aged 15–17 years are eligible for at most
two BVJs. In 2012, the government added a benefit to help families overcome poverty, called superação da
extrema pobreza (BSP), given to families who fell into the extreme poverty category. This supplementary
benefit provides the necessary amount to the family so that they have a per capita income at least above
the extreme poverty line. Table 2 shows the evolution of the benefit values. Conditional cash transfers have
a fixed number of installments, based on the children’s age, so beneficiary families keep receiving benefits
even if they are no longer eligible through increased income. To the best knowledge of the author, there are
no fixed criteria for the number of UCT installments.
Conditions are defined by health and educational criteria. For health, children up to seven years old
are required to have up-to-date vaccinations, and pregnant women must have regular medical check-ups and
prenatal examinations. Children and teenagers must be enrolled in school and have a minimum attendance
of 85% for those under 15 years old, and a minimum of 75% for those between 15 and 17 (MDS, 2011, 2015).
Since the rule used to allocate families between treatment (receiving a grant) and control groups is based
on income thresholds, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) is appropriate to verify treatment effects (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Using the allocation of beneficiaries in 2011, we can use the RDD to analyze fertility
outcomes in 2015. This large window of four years is useful to reduce the possibility of a confounding effect
of birth spacing, for example, of BF affecting how late beneficiaries will have an additional child (Todd et al.,
2012). The next section discusses how our database was built, and the measurement problems present in
the data that might invalidate identification on a RDD.
3 Data
3.1 Bolsa Famı́lia Registration
Family eligibility is determined based on household registry data collected and transmitted into a central
database maintained by the Ministry for Agrarian and Social Development (MDS). Data collection and
entry is decentralized to the municipalities, and database consolidation and management is controlled by the
federal bank Caixa, which is contracted by the MDS via a performance-based contract (Lindert et al., 2007;
MDS, 2015). Caixa, as the operating agent, is responsible for the payments. Finally, eligibility determination
is centralized by MDS, which then establishes the monthly beneficiary payroll. Each municipality has an
estimate of how many families in its territory should be eligible to become beneficiaries. Those estimates
are calculated by the MDS, which uses information from census and annual demographic data from IBGE.
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The Ministry can also utilize inputs from municipalities. Those calculations are open to the public (MDS,
2015). The order of priority for the program is as follows.
I. Priority families include indigenous groups, families in child labor situation, or families in insalubrious-
working conditions.
II. Other families are ordered by per-capita income and number of children. That is, families with lower
per capita income and more children are more successful in becoming beneficiaries.
Families fill out a standard federal questionnaire, which includes information on household composition,
income, and living conditions. Families can register at a permanent site provided by the city hall, but
municipalities can also sign people up at specific registration locations, provided they communicate this
in advance to the local population (Lindert et al., 2007; MDS, 2015). The database that contains the
responses is called Cadúnico, and is not only used by BF, but also by other social programs controlled by
the government, at both federal and local levels.4
The federal government encourages municipalities to keep the information updated and as accurate as
possible through financial incentives. For accuracy, the programs may cross validate Cadúnico information
with other governmental data such as tax reports or official employment registries. These cross-validation
procedures do not only occur during BF allocation, but also every other year to verify eligibility. Many
official databases, however, have limited use, since it is difficult to find information about the poorest, which
is BF’s target. For this study, it does appear that fraud or non-eligibility is not a major concern. In 2016,
the government reported that a large cross-validation process cancelled only 4% of the benefits, and 3% of
beneficiaries were called to update their information.5
We use the 2011 Cadúnico database in conjunction with a second database that contains BF payment
information, provided by Caixa, to determine BF eligibility, and the 2015 Cadúnico to analyze the outcomes.
The Cadúnico databases are only available for researchers upon request to the MDS, whereas the Caixa data
is open to the public. Each person in the Cadúnico and Caixa databases is allocated a unique identifier,
called número de identificação social (NIS).
4A brief description of these programs are in table A1.
5There is reason to believe that data reliability was similar across the years in our study. Because BF is a major program, it
has reasonable coverage by official channels and the media, and a high rate of fraud would have a high chance of being reported.
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3.2 Database Construction
A Cadúnico database of a certain year is a cross-sectional file that stores information on every member of
every registered family for that year. For subsequent years, the Cadúnico keeps information that was not
updated on the previous year. Each household has an unique identifier and every individual has a NIS
number. The data includes date of birth, current and past education, race, income, income composition
(e.g., work, pension, unemployment benefits, donations), general expenses, physical disabilities, an indicator
for the head of the household, and the degree of kinship in relation to the head of the household (e.g.,
spouse, son/daughter,parent, etc). There is also household information such as number of rooms, number
of bedrooms, and floor and wall material, as well as indicators of whether electricity, running water, a sewer
and trash collecting are present and how they are supplied. Finally, there is registry information: the original
year of registry and the last date of update. Tables 3 and 4 provide summary statistics of the main variables
in the 2011 Cadúnico database, both for individuals and households. In 2011, Cadúnico had information
on more than 75 million individuals - roughly one third of the Brazilian population. As it is, however, the
dataset is not suitable for our analysis. We proceeded to clean the data in several steps. To reduce the impact
of confounding programs, we considered only families that started their registry in 2011 (7.5% of individuals)
and also families where the woman was the head of the family, since only women can be recipients for BF
and also because we can only verify motherhood through the kinship variables, which are always in relation
to the head of the household. This corresponds to 82% of all reported heads of household that started their
registry on 2011. We then skewed the data to women of childbearing age (16-44 years old in 2011), with at
least one child (for CCT eligibility) and at most 10 children (women with more than 10 children corresponds
to less than 0.01% of the observations). To obtain fertility outcomes variables at the end of the period, we
then matched those observations to the 2015 Cadúnico database. The match was guaranteed to be 100%:
due to privacy concerns, if a household or individual information is deleted from a Cadúnico database in a
given year, it is deleted from all years. In other words, if someone was in the database in 2011 and deleted
in 2015, there is no way to verify the former since this observation is missing in both datasets. However,
as will be clarified in the next sections, complete deletion is uncommon, and the MDS regularly maintains
observations that are up to four years of age. Our measures for fertility were a dummy variable indicating
whether or not the registered woman had at least one childbirth in the 2012-2015 period and, conditional on
having a childbirth in the 2012-2015, the time period between births, or birth spacing. Instead of averaging
the difference in birth periods for each woman, which depends on the current parity, we considered the birth
spacing between the women’s last birth and the one immediately previous, that is, the final observed parity
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birth spacing. Also, if a woman had more than one birth, we only considered the last one. As will be shown
in the next sections, less than 10% of all women who had a birth in the analyzed period had more than one
birth. To make birth spacing comparable across different parities and to increase our statistical power, we
standardized the birth spacing (i.e., z-score birth spacing), measured in days and across parities, using the
2011 Cadúnico distribution as a basis.6 The mean and standard deviation of birth spacing can be found in
Table A2.
The Cadúnico database does not provide information on whether a family was a BF beneficiary. To
verify whether or not a woman was a beneficiary, we used the Caixa database. The Caixa database provides
monthly information on BF payments, starting in 2011. It includes the head of the household NIS, the
municipality, and the monthly payment. We then matched the Caixa NISs with Cadúnico NISs to determine
which observations in the Cadúnico database are BF beneficiaries. It was not possible to identify whether
a certain transfer was unconditional, conditional or a combination of both, but we could verify possible
combinations of UCT and CCT payments that could match each monthly amount. The complete procedure
of benefit identification can be found in the Data Appendix, Table B1. The match for 2011 performed
well: around 99.5% payments are uniquely identified as either CCT, UCT, or a combination. Finally,
Table 5 provide summary statistics of this more manageable dataset, which includes Cadúnico and payment
information.
It is important to mention that our measures of occurring births and birth spacing were not perfect.
Since we relied mostly on self-registry, there were delays between the birth and the registry of the child, and
child mortality was imperfectly captured, since a death and a birth within the analyzed period counts as no
additional children. Our fertility measure was also not able to capture reproductive intentions, since it did
not take into account miscarriages and stillbirths. Finally, one might be concerned about measurement error
regarding reported births. The families themselves must provide proof of existence, and this can only be
formally achieved through birth certificates or government provided IDs. Therefore, birth information, and
consequently, fertility outcomes, are less prone to this kind of measurement error. The next section discusses
other potential measurement concerns in our database.
3.3 Measurement Concerns: Update Pattern in Cadúnico
To remain eligible for social programs, registered families need to update their information on Cadúnico on a
biennial basis. Thus, a family that did not update in a given year should not be seen as an attrition problem
6To obtain a better picture of Brazilian birth spacing pattern, we included all head of the household women registered up
until 2011
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if their registry was updated in the previous two years. One might question if there might be an attrition
problem if information older than two years is erased from the data. Fortunately, the MDS is flexible in
that regard: if a family does not update, their registry remains in the database for at least two more years.
To reduce the risk of manipulation by municipalities, the only reasons that a registry can be excluded from
the database are refusal to update information when solicited by an official agent, fraud, court decision, by
family request, or death. There is a difference in how BF beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries update their
information, however. For the observations in Table 5, while 90% of BF observations were up-to-date at 2015
(i.e., their last year of update was at least 2013), less than half of non-beneficiaries (46%) had their registry
up-to-date. Particularly, beneficiaries have more incentives to update due to program monitoring, or due to
fear of losing eligibility. That is, the marginal cost of updating is low compared to the financial benefits.
It would seem that non-beneficiaries self-update if and only if they find that the marginal improvement
in BF eligibility or payment is higher than the cost of self-reporting. This marginal improvement may be
very small in the case that there is no new information to update, or in the case of minor events. Since
additional children improves eligibility because it reduces per-capita income and is an eligibility tiebreaker,
non-beneficiaries have a great incentive to update their registry in the event of childbirth. Roughly, non-
updated fertility information is not a classical attrition problem, but rather indicates that the previous
registry did not change in the period. Further, using only up-to-date information could have underestimated
our results: beneficiaries update frequently, while non-beneficiaries could be updating only when they have
a child. In light of what was presented, we used updated and non-updated fertility information in our main
outcomes, which can give unbiased estimates based on a reasonable hypothesis: both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries have, in the absence of treatment, the same incentives to keep information about the number
of children up-to-date. For robustness checks, we will also present results using only up-to-date registry
information, and we also applied a non-parametric approach presented by Gerard et al. (2020) that takes
into account the difference in update patterns to estimate bounds on the treatment effects.
3.4 Measurement Concerns: Manipulation and Heaping
We conduct manipulation tests to verify if there was manipulation of the running variable. More formally,
we implemented the test proposed by McCrary (2008) to check for jumps in the density of per capita income
in 2011 at the R$ 140 cutoff. The standard McCrary test shows strong signs of manipulation, as can
be seen in Figure 2 (p-values ≤ 0.01). Manipulation is enough to invalidate the RD strategy, but, as is
common in income variables, we have a common behavior that might be affecting the manipulation: heaping
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(Barreca et al., 2016; Zinn and Würbach, 2016). Manipulation tests do not differentiate between heaping
and manipulation, and, when the cutoff is a point of heaping, there is a strong possibility that these tests
will indicate manipulation where there is none (Barreca et al., 2016).
Variables that can take real values are subject to rounding, which agglomerates observations at specific
points. Some examples of such variables includes income, expenditure, weight, and time (Pudney, 2008;
Manski and Molinari, 2010; Barreca et al., 2011; Zinn and Würbach, 2016). Heaped values have negative
effects on statistical analyses when they are not random, resulting in inconsistent estimates (Manski and
Molinari, 2010; Barreca et al., 2011; Dong, 2015; Barreca et al., 2016; Zinn and Würbach, 2016; Giustinelli
et al., 2018). In an approach known as donut RD, observations close to the cutoff that might be heaping
points are dropped, and the analysis for the other observations can be considered to be valid (Almond and
Doyle, 2011; Eggers et al., 2015; Barreca et al., 2016). This approach has been used for variables such as
GPA scores (Carruthers and Özek, 2016), time of birth (Barreca et al., 2011), and electorate results (Eggers
et al., 2015). In the Cadúnico database, both family and per capita income are rounded to the nearest
integer.7 Since family income is reported by the families, we identified heaping points in the family income.
As in most similar previous studies, we identify most of the heaped values graphically. Figure 1 indicates
possible heaping points for total family income. Similar to other surveys where income is reported, there is
a strong preference for final digit zero (Manski and Molinari, 2010; Zinn and Würbach, 2016). Additionally,
many individuals may round their income to the minimal wage imposed by law. Therefore, we identified
two types of heaping: in multiples of the minimal wage (MW) in 2011 (R$540 until March, R$545 from
March to December) and in multiples of 10. In our case, the 2011 cutoff - R$140 - was a heaping value. If
we used only households that did not heap their income, we could obtain consistent estimations provided
that basic assumptions for the RD identification were met for that subset (Barreca et al., 2016). Figure 3
shows the McCrary tests for non-heaped observations, around the CCT cutoff, which demonstrates no sign
of manipulation, tested either on the main group of analysis or on the birth spacing group (main group,
conditional on giving birth).
7It is not known why there was rounding in the per capita income; it might be easier to analyze or store the data. Nonetheless,
our manipulation tests, first and second stage results were robust to the use of unrounded per capita income
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4 Empirical Framework and First Stage Estimation
Following closely the notation in Hahn et al. (2001), in a traditional RD setup,8 our average treatment effect
for treatment compliers (LATE) is
ΘBF = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c, limx→c−DBF (x) > limx→c+DBF (x)] (1)
in which the dummy variable DBF denotes the treatment - being a BF beneficiary - as a function of the
running variable X (per capita income in R$2011 values). The variables Y (1) and Y (0) denote our outcomes
of interest - an indicator of having at least one birth between 2012 and 2015 and z-score birth spacing -
as a function of the BF treatment, and c is our poverty line of R$140. To analyze the first dependent
variable, we used our main group of analysis: women from 16-44 years of age, who registered with Cadúnico
in 2011 as head of the household. To analyze birth spacing, we restricted the main group to women who
had births, since there was no variance on the z-score for the subset with no births. This is the birth spacing
group. Most RD estimations restrict the analysis within a bandwidth around the cutoff. Within optimal
bandwidths calculated using the Calonico et al. (2014) methodology9 around the cutoff, we defined our
(linear) parametric form to estimate equation (1):
Yi = α0 +ΘBFDBF,i + θ1(Xi − c) + θ2DBF,i × (Xi − c) + ǫi (2)
where Xi is the per-capita income of woman i in 2011 and ǫi is the error term. To correctly identify and
estimate the treatment effect, we must show that the conditions of equation (1) are satisfied (i.e., the first
stage of a RDD10). Formally, the first stage corresponds to estimating the following regression:
DBF,i = γ + γ0✶[Xi ≤ c] + γ1(Xi − c) + γ2✶[Xi ≤ c]× (Xi − c) + ηi (3)
where ✶[Xi ≤ c] is a dummy variable to indicate if the per capita income is below the cutoff and η is an error
term. We estimate equation (3) using both first and second degree polynomials for the (Xi − c) variable,
and also for the following treatments: BF (grouping its two components), CCT, and UCT.
Our first stage estimations are graphically represented by Figures 4 and 5. For the main group, there is a
8See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a theoretical review and applications of the RD design
9Many different optimal bandwidths calculations are presented in Calonico et al. (2014) Unless otherwise stated, we will
make use of mean squared error optimal and under-smoothing bandwidths approaches
10Implicitly assumed are the standard conditions for the RD estimation: there are no defiers and the distribution of potential
outcomes and potential treatment states is continuous in X, with finite moments.
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clear discontinuity for BF and CCT, and, surprisingly, a small but significant jump on the UCT component,
despite this benefit being given only to those below the extreme poverty cutoff. Although it is not a
large effect, we decided on a more conservative estimation, using BF as a treatment instead of the CCT
component, since the UCT might be a confounding factor. For the birth spacing group, however, the UCT
had no discontinuity. In that case, the BF effect can roughly be translated as a CCT effect. Table 6
shows the first stage regressions. As expected, BF and CCT have virtually the same results, since all BF
beneficiaries are CCT beneficiaries as well. Using second-degree polynomials strengthens the results of the
first stage estimation. Notice, however, that compliance is not perfect. There is delay between registry,
analysis, and benefit assignment, and this depends on the family position in the waiting list. Municipalities
are able to enroll MDS’s estimated number of eligible families, but if there are more registered individuals
than predicted, a waiting list for eligibility analysis is created (MDS, 2011, 2015). Moreover, this quota is
not binding in all municipalities. This leads to a fuzzy RD design, rather than a sharp one, as compliance
is not perfect. In that case, ✶[Xi ≤ c] and ✶[Xi ≤ c]× (Xi − c) act as instrumental variables for DBF,i and
DBF,i × (Xi − c).
For our results to be valid, no covariate should drive the results. That is, covariates should be continuous
at the cutoff to ensure that the randomness brought by the eligibility rule is as good as possible. We thus
compared observable variables above and below the cutoff, using the same parametric form as in equation
(3). Visual and regression results can be found in the appendix, in Figures A1 to A7 and table A3 for the
main group, and Figures A8 to A14 and Table A4 for the birth spacing group. In general, the differences are
statistically insignificant. Most of the statistically significant differences are small in magnitude, specially in
the case of covariates that might be related to fertility, such as work related variables, ethnicity, or number
of children.
5 Second Stage Estimation and Results
Before we proceed in presenting the estimates, it is important to notice that, since BF is allocated on a
monthly basis, dynamics in treatment assignment are present. The estimates in this paper represent a
dynamic intent-to-treat effect (Cellini et al., 2010), where we verify the effect of cash transfers on fertility
rates without controlling for the families - or the government’s - behavior after the 2011 allocation. To
strengthen the reduced form results and to give a better economic interpretation of them, we present an
estimate that gives a rough sense of the benefit dynamics, the total number of monthly installments received
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between 2011 and 2015, around the R$ 140 cutoff. These estimates are visually represented in Figures 6.
The discontinuity jump for the main group is roughly 20 installments, a bit more than one and a half years of
benefits. Considering that most beneficiaries would start being paid at the end of 2011 or at 2012, and that
the cutoff shifted to the right in 2014, the dynamics showed that those above the cutoff were not immediately
selected to treatment after 2011. If that was the case, our estimates would not bring meaningful results. For
the birth spacing group, the difference is smaller, albeit not surprising. Since the birth spacing group had
at least one birth, the per capita income may have decreased substantially, increasing the probability to be
selected to the program.
Table 7 summarizes the accumulated number of births between 2012-2015, by women with a 2011 per
capita income within a R$50 bandwidth around the cutoff. Only 15% had births, and of that subset, around
93% had only one child. Visualizations of the dependent variables around the cutoff are in Figure 7. Visually,
there is a small but insignificant difference in the birth outcome.
Second stage results11 for equation (2) can be found in Table 8. In the table, Panel A shows a näıve
sharp estimation, while Panel B shows the result for fuzzy estimates. First, we noted that for the childbirth
outcome, both sharp and fuzzy are very close to zero. Note that using only up-to-date units for our fuzzy
design changes the sign, which supports our suspicions of a downward bias caused by attrition. Regarding
birth spacing, we noted that we had a negative, statistically significant effect in all of the estimations. The
LATE corresponds to a roughly -0.5 z-score. For example, considering the third parity statistics in table
A2, beneficiaries reduced their birth spacing - relative to the second child - by 460 days, or 15 months, on
average.
We can estimate sharp bounds on the treatment effects in case the attrition in the registries’ updates
are driving the results. Consider U a dummy variable for attrition for the year 2015, assuming 1 when the
individual has an up-to-date info in 2015, and 0 otherwise. For the interaction U ×X, it is possible to use
the bounds of Gerard et al. (2020) to address the attrition problem, since a jump at the cutoff for U × X
might be seen as a manipulation. Gerard et al. (2020) derives a non-parametric methodology with which
it is possible to identify sharp bounds on treatment effects under manipulation or other phenomena that
can alter the continuity around the cutoff - with only few additional hypotheses on the RD design.12 The
11To reduce confoundedness, we drop observations that changed municipalities in 2015, relatively to 2011. We ran regressions
using all observations, and the results were similar. Around 85% of the observations remained after this procedure for both
groups
12In short, the approach relies on two types of unobservable units. First is the always-assigned units, for which the realization
of the running variable is always on one side of the cutoff. Those include manipulators, those that update more frequently, and
nonrandom heaping. The second type are potentially assigned units - units that satisfy the standard conditions for identification
under the RDD. One of the hypotheses is that the manipulation is one-sided and that are no mass points on the running variable
around the cutoff value. This might be the case in our context: it is not rational for someone to manipulate their income up,
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parameter of interest is similar to the one in equation (1), where we estimate LATE for those below the
cutoff, and the potentially assigned units would be also units that in the absence of the treatment would not
change their update patterns:
ΘboundsBF = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|U ×X = c
−, D−BF > D
+
BF ] (4)
Figure 8 shows the update pattern around the cutoff for 2015. For the main group, there is a jump in
the update pattern, which could be the result of BF assignment. Not surprisingly, we found no evidence
of a jump in the update pattern for the birth spacing group, since families update the registry to inform a
birth. The bounds results can be found in Table 9. Panel A shows the basic inputs for bound estimation.
Always assigned are those that always keep their info updated in the presence of available treatment, and are
always below the cutoff. The nonparametric estimation of the treatment take-up is close to the parametric
estimations. Using U × X as the running variable is similar to using X but with only up-to-date units;
notice that the fuzzy coefficient of Panel B is not statistically different from the ‘up-to-date only’ estimation
in Table 8. As is the case in the parametric regressions, the results are not statically different from zero for
a 95% confidence interval. The bounds estimations reveal a rather asymmetrical result, with a large lower
bound. Indeed, how the ‘non-updaters’ would update their information influences the treatment effect and,
although a lower point of -25 p.p. might be difficult, we can infer that at most, the possible positive effects
of CCT on fertility are rather small. However, it is important to note that the large bounds could be the
effect of the relatively small difference between the take-up increase and the share of always assigned (i.e.,
‘nonupdaters’).
6 Robustness
We made several robustness checks. Particularly, we estimated equation (2) with different bandwidths and
kernels. Table 10 present the results for the main group, and Table 11 for the birth spacing group. The
estimations for at least one birth were consistent across different bandwidth and kernel choices, with only
two specifications that used only up-to-date observations being statistically significant. Most of the results
were similar for the z-score birth spacing, although the magnitude was reduced for larger bandwidths. In
summary, the main results were robust to different specifications.
since all benefits are given below a certain threshold. Upward rounding may happen, but for those just below the cutoff - they
will still be at the cutoff and thus eligible. Further, we also suppose that manipulators round their reported income as well
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7 External Validity
The treatment effect identified in our study only applies around the cutoff, and, being a fuzzy RD, only for
compliers. Yet, researchers and policy makers may also be interested in generalizing the findings, particularly
to subpopulations away from the threshold. Recent work has explored ways of testing whether RD findings
may be generalized, with some studies exploring the use of pretreatment covariates (Angrist and Rokkanen,
2015; Rokkanen, 2015). We proceeded to evaluate the stability of our RD results by implementing tests
suggested by the recent work of Dong (2015); Cerulli et al. (2017); Bertanha and Imbens (2019), which require
no use of additional covariates other than the forcing variable and require fewer additional assumptions than
those already assumed here. Dong and Lewbel (2015); Cerulli et al. (2017) presented the treatment effect
derivative (TED), which requires an additional assumption of smoothness in higher order derivatives of the
regression function. The TED is basically the derivative of the parametric RD outcome function with respect
to the running variable, close to the cutoff. A large TED means that a small change in the running variable
is associated with a large change in the treatment effect, calling into question the estimated LATE’s external
validity. In fuzzy designs, the change in the effect may come from a true change in the effect on the compliers,
or a change in the treatment compliance distribution. Cerulli et al. (2017) applied the TED framework to
the first stage to estimate a change in compliance composition, which the authors call a complier probability
derivative (CPD). A large CPD means a large change in compliance. Therefore, small values of TED and
CPD reinforce the external validity of the estimated treatment effects. Bertanha and Imbens (2019) created
mean tests that can be used to support the hypothesis of generalization. External validity means that the
compliance distribution must be independent of the conditional potential outcomes distribution, not only
on the expected value. Thus, it implies that average treatment effects for compliers and non-compliers just
below and just above the cutoff are the same. Essentially, the tests proposed by Bertanha and Imbens (2019)
are mean tests of such averages where the non-rejection of equality reinforces the assumption of external
validity.
To make better use of the TED framework, we use second-order polynomials in the regressions. A visual
explanation of the TED is in Figures 9 and 10: the TED corresponds to the tangent lines. We present our
estimations in Tables 12 and 13. On both uniform and triangular kernels, the results are similar. For the
birth variable, given the LATE estimate, it is not surprising that the TED estimate for childbirth is close
to zero. The compliers composition may change statistically, as the CPD results shows, but it is small in
magnitude. Further, we do not reject the hypothesis of equality of means of Bertanha and Imbens (2019).
This strengthens the view that BF had no impact on fertility for the 2012-2015 period, measured as at least
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one birth, for non-heaping units. Unless the heaping behavior is connected to a change in fertility decisions,
we can apply this result to the general population. Going further, and assuming that heaping behavior is
not influenced by cutoff changes and is not correlated with fertility decisions, then it is possible to say that
BF has no effect on fertility.
For the birth spacing outcome, the CPD/TED analysis is similar: the TED estimate is not large in
magnitude or statistically, but the complier composition shows evidence of instability, albeit small. However,
the mean test for the compliers is statistically significant, and is large enough so the joint test is also
statistically significant. Given these results, it is more difficult for us to assume that the birth spacing
reduction brought by BF can be generalized.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
More than a decade after its release, BF is arguably the most important pillar of Brazil’s welfare system.
However, cash transfers can, in theory, alter fertility decisions. If fertility increases overall, human capital
accumulation per capita may decrease if cash transfers’ incentives to increase children’s quality are few.
This study reinforces past literature results using a more reliable data, with a new identification strategy
and verifying more than one fertility outcome. Using data from Cadúnico, the database used to allocate BF
benefits, we took advantage of a discontinuity in the eligibility rule, implementing a regression discontinuity
design to verify the program’s impact on birth spacing and on the probability of having more children. In this
study, the causal effect of the program at the cutoff in the probability of having a childbirth is statistically
zero, and although update patterns are very different for treatment and control, the nonparametric approach
presented by Gerard et al. (2020) showed that at most, the positive effects on fertility were rather small.
This result is in line with other studies that analyzed the same outcome but with different methodologies,
and thus it shows the importance of using different methods to provide robust evidence in policy debates.
Using a different measure in regard to birth spacing, the results were surprising. Conditional on having a
birth, BF reduced birth spacing by, on average, 0.5 standard deviations in the pooled z-score. For families
waiting for a second child, this represents 19 months, and for the third child, 15 months. We also used
new econometric tools to check our RD’s external validity. While the RD results for childbirth seem to be
stable, providing support for a true average treatment effect of the program, the same was not found for
birth spacing: the effect on birth spacing is unstable and might vary away from the R$ 140 cutoff.
The findings in this study have support in the literature. In a context where technological advance
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requires large investments in child education, marginal financial incentives for more children seem to have
little effect in fertility decisions. Moreover, poor families in developing countries face a lack of credit markets,
so a cash transfer can alleviate credit constraints. This allows for more efficient investment in human capital,
which reduces incentives to increase fertility (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Weil, 2000; Todd and Wolpin,
2006). It might seem worrying that a cash transfer would reduce birth spacing, since reductions in birth
spacing might affect the health of the mother or of the children (Conde-Agudelo et al., 2006, 2012; Todd
et al., 2012), but the average birth spacing of Brazilian families registered in Cadúnico seems to be well above
the harmful threshold of 18 months. Before BF, this could be due to the effect of the lack of credit markets,
so families increased birth spacing to smooth consumption. Again, the transfer may be alleviating credit
constraints, so families may choose a new optimal birth spacing that can increase future income if economies
of scale exist when raising children (Galor and Weil, 1996; Schultz, 1997; Todd et al., 2012). This study also
supports the view that for a lifetime analysis, the quantity-quality trade-off might not be as clear-cut as the
general Becker and Lewis (1973) model demonstrates (Angrist et al., 2010). Therefore, we believe that the
policy debate should take into account the general evidence that cash transfer programs do not easily affect
fertility decisions (Stecklov et al., 2007; Fiszbein et al., 2009).
As it was designed, the BF program showed no effect on fertility rates, but it reduced the birth spacing,
on average. This reduction seems to be consequence of alleviating income restraints. Additionally, we
believe that the problems of manipulation and rounding we encountered may be affecting the targeting of
the program. Further studies on whether or not the eligibility rule is appropriate, which is mainly based on
self-reported income, are necessary.
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A. Conde-Agudelo, A. Rosas-Bermúdez, and A. C. Kafury-Goeta. Effects of birth spacing on maternal
health: a systematic review. American journal of obstetrics and gynecology, 196(4):297–308, 2007.
A. Conde-Agudelo, A. Rosas-Bermudez, F. Castaño, and M. H. Norton. Effects of birth spacing on maternal,
perinatal, infant, and child health: a systematic review of causal mechanisms. Studies in family planning,
19
43(2):93–114, 2012.
R. C. B. da Rocha. Conditional cash-transfer programs and fertility: Evidence from bolsa-famı́lia. In 31o
Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society, 2010.
J. DaVanzo, L. Hale, A. Razzaque, and M. Rahman. Effects of interpregnancy interval and outcome of the
preceding pregnancy on pregnancy outcomes in matlab, bangladesh. BJOG: An International Journal of
Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 114(9):1079–1087, 2007.
M. Doepke. Accounting for fertility decline during the transition to growth. Journal of Economic growth, 9
(3):347–383, 2004.
Y. Dong. Regression discontinuity applications with rounding errors in the running variable. Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 30(3):422–446, 2015.
Y. Dong and A. Lewbel. Identifying the effect of changing the policy threshold in regression discontinuity
models. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(5):1081–1092, 2015.
A. C. Eggers, A. Fowler, J. Hainmueller, A. B. Hall, and J. M. Snyder Jr. On the validity of the regression
discontinuity design for estimating electoral effects: New evidence from over 40,000 close races. American
Journal of Political Science, 59(1):259–274, 2015.
A. Fiszbein, N. R. Schady, and F. H. Ferreira. Conditional cash transfers: reducing present and future
poverty. World Bank Publications, 2009.
O. Galor and D. N. Weil. The gender gap, fertility, and growth. The American Economic Review, 86(3):
374–387, 1996.
O. Galor and D. N. Weil. Population, technology, and growth: From malthusian stagnation to the demo-
graphic transition and beyond. American economic review, 90(4):806–828, 2000.
O. Galor and J. Zeira. Income distribution and macroeconomics. The review of economic studies, 60(1):
35–52, 1993.
S. Garganta, L. Gasparini, M. Marchionni, and M. Tappatá. The effect of cash transfers on fertility: Evidence
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Tables
Table 1: BF’s eligibility categories from 2011 to 2015, by nominal monthly per capita income cutoffs (In
Brazilian Reais - R$)
Category 2003-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009-2010 2011-2013 2014-2015
Poverty 50 60 60 60 70 70 77
Extreme Poverty 100 120 120 120 140 140 154
Notes: A household falls into the extreme poverty category if its monthly per capita income is equal or less than the extreme poverty
threshold. A household falls into the poverty category if its monthly per capita income is above the extreme poverty threshold but
less or equal than the poverty cutoff. Source: MDS (2011, 2015)
Table 2: BF’s Benefits (excluding BSP) monthly payments from 2011 to 2015 in nominal values (In Brazilian
Reais - R$), by BF’s categories
Category Benefit 2003-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009-2010 2011-2013 2014-2015
Extreme Poverty
Basic 50 50 58 62 68 70 77
Variable 15 15 18 20 22 32 35
BVJ - - 30 30 33 38 42
Poverty
Basic - - - - - - - -
Variable 15 15 18 20 22 32 35
BVJ 30 30 33 38 42
Source: MDS (2011, 2015)
Table 3: Summary statistics for 2011 Cadúnico - Individual Information
Variables Percentage/Mean Percentage/Mean
Race: White 29.3% Kinship: Head of the household 29.7%
Race: Black-Brazilian 7.2% Kinship: Spouse (of head) 13.7%
Race: Oriental 0.3% Kinship: Son/daughter (of head) 51.6%
Race: Pardo-Brazilian 61.1% Kinship: Others 5.3%
Race: Indigenous 0.6%
Race: Missing 1.6% Year of Registry: Before or on 2007 15.7%
Gender: Female 45.2% Year of Registry: 2008 10.5%
Gender: Male 54.8% Year of Registry: 2009 30.9%
Age 26.2 Year of Registry: 2010 35.3%
Has disabilities 0.6% Year of Registry: 2011 7.6%
Obsevations 75,934,171
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R$ 108 Wastewater: Others 1.9%
Household: No of indi-
viduals
3.4 Wastewater: Missing 3.5%
Garbage: Collected 67.5%
Household: Urban 79.3% Garbage: Burned or buried 18.5%
Household: Number of
rooms
4.23 Garbage: Discharged in open air 5.9%
Household: Piped wa-
ter
70.5% Garbage: Others 8.1%
Household: Piped wa-
ter (missing info)
0.0% Electricity: Electric supply network 90.1%
Household: Have bath-
room
86.1% Electricity: Generators 2.0%
Household: Have bath-
room (missing info)
0.0% Electricity: Candles 1.8%
Water: Supply net-
work
68.2% Electricity: Others 5.0%
Water: Artesian
Aquifer
22.6% Electricity: Missing 1.1%
Water: Others 8.1% Region: North 9.7%
Water: Missing 1.1% Region: Northeast 44.6%
Wastewater: Sewer
system
40.4% Region: Center-west 6.4%
Wastewater: Septic
tank




11.5% Region: South 10.4%
Obsevations 22,176,258
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Table 5: Summary statistics: women of 16-44 years of age, registered in Cadúnico as head of the family and















Race: Pardo-Brazilian 60.1% Wastewater: Others 1.2%
Race: Indigenous 0.7% Wastewater: Missing 7.2%
Race: Missing 0.2% Garbage: Collected 77.0%








Education: None or some
(<4yrs of education)







Education: Some High School
education
25.0% Electricity: Generators 1.1%
Education: High school or
higher
29.3% Electricity: Candles 1.2%
Education: Missing 0.3% Electricity: Others 4.6%
Age 28.0 Electricity: Missing 3.4%
Have disabilities 0.6% Per Capita Income 106.6













Household: Piped water 78.7% Region: North 14.2%
Household: Piped water (miss-
ing info)
3.4% Region: Northeast 33.2%
Household: Has bathroom 78.7% Region: Center-west 8.3%
Household: Has bathroom
(missing info)
3.4% Region: Southeast 33.9%
Water: Supply network 72.4% Region: South 10.3%













Notes: This table presents summary statistics for key variables. Data comes from merging yearly data from
Cadúnico and Caixa payment registries, from 2011 up to Apr 2012. We considered only 2011 entering families, in
which the woman was considered head of the family (>80% of the families), within fertile age (16-44) and with at
least one child.
24
Table 6: Effect of having a 2011 per capita income below the poverty cutoff (R$140) on the probability of being a BF, CCT or
UCT beneficiary.
A. Main Group Linear Regressions B. Birth spacing Group Linear Regressions
A1. BF [1] [2] [3] B1. BF [1] [2] [3]
Below cutoff 0.58** 0.49** 0.46** 0.55** 0.44** 0.50**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Income Linear Interaction No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Income Quadratic Interaction No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 15,274 15,274 15,274 2,030 2,030 2,030
R
2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37
A2. CCT B2. CCT
Below cutoff 0.58** 0.49** 0.46** 0.55** 0.44** 0.50**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Income Linear Interaction No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Income Quadratic Interaction No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 15,274 15,274 15,274 2,030 2,030 2,030
R
2 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37
A3. UCT B3. UCT
Below cutoff 0.14** 0.07** 0.07** 0.12** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Income Linear Interaction No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Income Quadratic Interaction No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 15,274 15,274 15,274 2,030 2,030 2,030
R
2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for
1st and 2nd order polynomials and uniform kernels. Main group unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age, registered
in Cadúnico as head of the family and with at least one child. Birth space group unit of observation: main group, conditional
on having at least one birth during the 2012-2015 period. Bandwidths: R$ 36 for the main group and R$ 32 for birth spacing
group. Heteroscedastic robust-errors in parentheses. P-values: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
25
Table 7: Number of births per women in 2012-2015, within a $40 bandwidth around the BF
cutoff






Notes: Unit of observation: women of 16-44 years
of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico
in 2011 as the head of the family.
Table 8: Average treatment effects of BF’s CCT for the period 2012-2015. Dependent variables: dummy
for at least one birth during 2012-2015, and birth spacing z-score
At least one birth in 2012-2015 Birth spacing z-score
Estimate 95% CI Observations Estimate 95% CI Observations
A.Sharp RD estimate 0.010 [-.011; .032] 13,888 -0.246 [-.455; -.036] 1,732
B.Fuzzy RD estimates
Θcct 0.019 [-.024; .062] 13,888 -0.494 [-.940; -.047] 1,732
up-to-date units
Θcct -0.046 [-.117; .024] 9,695 -0.523 [-.966; -.080] 1,706
Notes: Fuzzy regressions follow equation (2) specification. Units that changed municipality during the 2012-2015 period are
not considered. Bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) under-smoothing methodology, with a 1st order polynomial
and an uniform kernel. Bandwidth for the At least one birth variable: R$ 36. Bandwidth for the birth spacing z-score
variable: R$ 32. Confidence intervals calculated with heteroscedastic robust errors.
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Table 9: Average treatment effects on the probability of having births in 2012 to 2015.
Forcing variable: interaction of up-to-date 2015 registry dummy with 2011 per capita income.
Dependent variable: dummy for at least one birth in 2012-2015
Basic inputs for bounds
estimation
Share of always assigned units 0.17 -
Increase in treatment take-up at the
cutoff
0.42 -
At least one birth
Estimate 95% CI
A. Sharp RD estimates
point estimate -0.025 [-.05; .004]
Bounds on Θ−BF [-.19; .011] [-.23; .04]
B. Fuzzy RD estimates
point estimate -0.065 [-.137; .007]
Bounds on Θ−BF [-.25; .025] [-.29; .095]
Notes: Total number of observations: 73,969 women with at least one child, aged 16-44 years old,
with non-heaped income. Bandwidth for estimation of the discontinuity in the density of U × X:
127. Bandwidth calculated by McCrary methodology (McCrary, 2008). Bandwidth for the lo-
cal linear estimation of conditional means: R$36. Bandwidth calculated by Calonico et al. (2014)
under-smoothing methodology, with uniform kernel. Confidence intervals are based on 500 boot-
strap samples.
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Table 10: Robustness check for at least one birth dependent variable. LATE estimations using
different kernel and polynomial degree inputs
At least one birth
Fuzzy RD estimates
ΘBF 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.023 0.015
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Kernel uniform triangular triangular uniform triangular triangular
Polynomial degree 1 1 1 2 2 2
Left bandwidth 36 43 49 51 47 49
Right bandwidth 36 43 74 51 47 132
Observations 13,888 15,989 23,833 19,117 17,644 33,273
(only update units)
ΘBF -0.046 -0.048 -0.051* -0.060 -0.049 -0.059**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Kernel uniform triangular triangular uniform triangular triangular
Polynomial degree 1 1 1 2 2 2
Left bandwidth 36 43 49 51 47 49
Right bandwidth 36 43 74 51 47 132
Observations 9,695 11,133 15,864 13,245 12,275 20,772
Notes: Regressions follows (2) specification, with different inputs for kernel and polynomial degree. Unit ob-
servation: women, aged 16-44 years old, with non-heaped income. Bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al.
(2014) under-smoothing methodology. Heteroscedastic robust-errors in parentheses. P-values: ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05.
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Table 11: Robustness check for z-score birth spacing dependent variable. LATE estimations using different
kernel and polynomial degree inputs
Z-score birth spacing
Fuzzy RD estimates
ΘBF -0.494** -0.423** -0.324* -0.359** -0.352** -0.261*
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Kernel uniform triangular triangular uniform triangular triangular
Degree 1 1 1 2 2 2
Left bandwidth 32 48 41 55 76 72
Right bandwidth 32 48 82 55 76 99
Observations 1,732 2,557 3,229 2,926 4,418 4,656
only update units
ΘBF -0.523** -0.456** -0.337** -0.375** -0.367* -0.273*
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15)
Kernel uniform triangular triangular uniform triangular triangular
Degree 1 1 1 2 2 2
Left bandwidth 32 48 41 55 76 72
Right bandwidth 32 48 82 55 76 99
Observations 1,706 2,523 3,180 2,887 4,350 4,584
Notes: Regressions follows (2) specification, with different inputs for kernel and polynomial degree. Unit ob-
servation: women, aged 16-44 years old, with non-heaped income, conditional on having a birth in 2012-2015.
Bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) under-smoothing methodology. Heteroscedastic robust-errors
in parentheses. P-values: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0−] -.05 30
(.034)












E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0−] -.1 55
(.46)
E[Y |D = 1, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 1, (X − c) → 0−] -.58** 38
(0.22)
Joint F-test 6.72*
Notes: TED and CPD calculated based on Dong and Lewbel (2015); Cerulli et al. (2017) framework.
Means tests and joint mean test based on Bertanha and Imbens (2019) framework. Bandwidths cal-
culated by Calonico et al. (2014) under-smoothing methodology, with 1st order polynomial for mean
tests and 2nd order for TED and CPD. Heteroscedastic robust-errors in parentheses. P-values: **
p<0.01, * p<0.05. Errors are based on 500 bootstrap samples.
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E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0−] -.046 45
(.029)












E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 0, (X − c) → 0−] -.13 53
(.46)
E[Y |D = 1, (X − c) → 0+]− E[Y |D = 1, (X − c) → 0−] -.56** 41
(.20)
Joint F-test 8.03*
Notes: TED and CPD calculated based on Dong and Lewbel (2015); Cerulli et al. (2017) framework.
Means tests and joint mean test based on Bertanha and Imbens (2019) framework. Bandwidths cal-
culated by Calonico et al. (2014) under-smoothing methodology, with 1st order polynomial for mean
tests and 2nd order for TED and CPD. Heteroscedastic robust-errors in parentheses. P-values: **
p<0.01, * p<0.05. Errors are based on 500 bootstrap samples.
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Figures
Figure 1: Cadúnico Family Income
Notes: Family income divided in multiples of 10, Minimal Wages(MW) or in final digits 1 to 9.
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Figure 2: McCrary Tests on R$ 140 Cutoffs (Non-heaped income observations)
(a) Main group: density value < .01
Notes: Standard McCrary (2008) test. Income skewed at 99%. Dashed lines correspond to 95% CI. Main group corresponds to all
observations at table 5: women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family.
Figure 3: McCrary Tests on R$ 140 Cutoffs (Non-heaped income observations)
(a) Main group: full histogram
(b) Main group: density value <
.003
(c) Birth spacing group: full his-
togram
(d) Birth spacing group: density
value < .003
Notes: Standard McCrary test McCrary (2008). Income skewed at 99%. Dashed lines correspond to 95% CI. Main group corresponds
to all observations at table 5: women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the
family. Birth spacing group corresponds to main group, conditional on having at least one birth in the period 2012-2015
33
Figure 4: Probability of being a BF,CCT and UCT recipient as a function of the running variable - Main
group
(a) 1st degree polynomial for BF treat-
ment
(b) 2nd degree polynomial for BF
treatment
(c) 1st degree polynomial for CCT
treatment
(d) 2nd degree polynomial for CCT
treatment
(e) 1st degree polynomial for UCT
treatment
(f) 2nd degree polynomial for UCT
treatment
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for 1st and
2nd orders polynomials and uniform kernel. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors.
Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age, with
at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table 6 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure 5: Probability of being a BF, CCT and UCT recipient as a function of the running variable - Birth
spacing group
(a) 1st degree polynomial for BF
treatment
(b) 2nd degree polynomial for BF
treatment
(c) 1st degree polynomial for CCT
treatment
(d) 2nd degree polynomial for CCT
treatment
(e) 1st degree polynomial for UCT
treatment
(f) 2nd degree polynomial for UCT
treatment
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for 1st and
2nd orders polynomials and uniform kernel. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors.
Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age, with at
least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth on the period 2012-2015.
See table 6 for p-values and No of observations.
Figure 6: Benefit dynamics: Number of monthly BF installments received, from 2011 to 2015, as function
of the running variable
(a) Main group (b) Birth spacing group
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order
polynomial and uniform kernel. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95%
confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Main group unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age,
with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. Birth spacing group unit of observation: main group
conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015
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Figure 7: Outcomes as a function of 2011 income per capita - R$ 140 cutoff
(a) Probability of having at least one birth in 2012-2015 (b) Z-score birth spacing (2015)
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order
polynomial and uniform kernel. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95%
confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Main group unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age,
with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. Birth spacing group unit of observation: main group
conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015
Figure 8: 2015 update pattern around the R$ 140 cutoff
(a) Main group (b) Birth spacing group
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order
polynomial and uniform kernel. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95%
confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Main group unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age,
with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. Birth spacing group unit of observation: main group
conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015
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Figure 9: TED: Fuzzy RD discontinuity in the probability of having a birth in 2012-2015, and tangent lines
(a) Uniform Kernel (b) Triangular Kernel
Notes: Regressions follow (2) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 2nd order
polynomial and uniform/triangular kernels, following Cerulli (2016); Cerulli et al. (2017) methodology. TED corresponds to the
difference(s) of the tangent lines at Running variable = 0. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Unit of
observation: women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. Dependent
variable: Had at least one birth in the period 2012-2015 (=1/0).
Figure 10: TED: Fuzzy RD discontinuity in the z-score birth spacing (2015), and tangent lines
(a) Uniform Kernel (b) Triangular Kernel
Notes: Regressions follow (2) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 2nd order
polynomial and uniform kernel, following Cerulli (2016); Cerulli et al. (2017) methodology. TED corresponds to the difference(s) of the
tangent lines at Running variable = 0. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Unit of observation: women




Table A1: Cadúnico’s federal programs
Program Description Target









Pregnant women in Alagoas State
in food insecurity situations
PRONATEC Free professional training
Registered individuals between 16
and 59 years old
PETI
Social activities and cash
transfers through BF
Child labor vulnerable families
below the poverty line.
Minha Casa, Minha Vida Housing loans Any registered family
Tarifa Social de Energia
Elétrica
Electric Bills discounts BPC’s beneficiary families




Families below the poverty line
Fee isemption for
examinations







anyone between 15 to 29 years of
age with educational deficits
Source: MDS (2011, 2015)
Table A2: Summary Statistics of Birth Spacing between Two Parities in the Cadúnico
Database of 2011, Measured in Days
Starting Parity|Final Parity Median Mean Standard Deviation N
1|2 1,108 1,443 1,144 10,916,827
2|3 989 1,270 918 5,082,771
3|4 905 1,134 799 1,913,769
4|5 854 1,041 697 726,246
5|6 820 970 614 281,592
6|7 789 911 550 109,659
7|8 763 863 493 41,716
8|9 730 821 460 15,098
9|10 698 786 443 5,162
Notes: Data obtained in Cadúnico database of 2011. All Dadúnico observations are considered,
independent of the year of registry. First year of registry in the data: 2001.
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Race: White 0.36 0.38 0.01 15,274
Race: Black-Brazilian 0.10 0.09 0.37 15,274
Race: Oriental 0.01 0.01 0.27 15,274
Race: Pardo-Brazilian 0.53 0.51 0.00 15,274
Race: Indigenous 0.00 0.00 0.56 15,274
Race: Missing 0.00 0.00 0.04 15,274
Work: Worked in the last week 0.34 0.37 0.76 15,274
Work: Missing 0.36 0.28 0.00 15,274
Education: None or some Primary education
(<4yrs of education)
0.11 0.09 0.85 15,274
Education: Primary Incomplete 0.35 0.32 0.16 15,274
Education: Some High School education 0.26 0.26 0.28 15,274
Education: High school or higher 0.28 0.33 0.53 15,274
Education: Missing 0.00 0.00 0.43 15,274
Live with spouse 0.52 0.60 0.01 15,274
Age 29.96 30.31 0.06 15,274
Have disabilities 0.01 0.01 0.87 15,274
Number of Children 2.16 2.04 0.00 15,274
Birth spacing z-score (2011) 0.15 0.25 0.31 9,863
Household: Urban 0.88 0.90 0.10 15,274
Household: Number of rooms 4.16 4.30 0.63 14,923
Household: Piped water 0.87 0.89 0.16 15,274
Household: Piped water (missing info) 0.02 0.02 0.36 15,274
Household: Have bathroom 0.95 0.95 0.54 15,274
Household: Have bathroom (missing info) 0.02 0.02 0.36 15,274
Water: Supply network 0.80 0.83 0.05 15,274
Water: Artesian Aquifer 0.14 0.13 0.14 15,274
Water: Others 0.04 0.02 0.01 15,274
Water: Missing 0.02 0.02 0.36 15,274
Wastewater: Sewer system 0.56 0.60 0.09 15,274
Wastewater: Septic tank 0.36 0.33 0.40 15,274
Wastewater: Directly discharged at water
sources
0.03 0.03 0.06 15,274
Wastewater: Others 0.01 0.00 0.25 15,274
Wastewater: Missing 0.04 0.04 0.84 15,274
Garbage: Collected 0.82 0.85 0.09 15,274
Garbage: Burned or Buried 0.07 0.06 0.05 15,274
Garbage: Discharged at open air 0.01 0.01 0.15 15,274
Garbage: Others 0.08 0.06 0.48 15,274
Electricity: Electric supply network 0.93 0.95 0.37 15,274
Electricity: Generators 0.00 0.00 0.64 15,274
Electricity: Candles 0.00 0.00 0.74 15,274
Electricity: Others 0.04 0.03 0.81 15,274
Electricity: Missing 0.02 0.02 0.36 15,274
Income: Receive pension 0.13 0.11 0.01 15,274
Income: Receive pension (missing) 0.41 0.34 0.00 15,274
Income: Donations 0.07 0.05 0.69 15,274
Income: Donations (missing) 0.45 0.37 0.00 15,274
Income: Unemployment benefits 0.00 0.01 0.40 15,274
Income: Unemployment benefits (missing) 0.45 0.37 0.00 15,274
Income: other sources than job related 0.18 0.11 0.41 15,274
Income: other sources than job related
(missing)
0.31 0.29 0.00 15,274
Region: North 0.09 0.07 0.07 15,274
Region: Northeast 0.23 0.19 0.15 15,274
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Region: Central-West 0.09 0.11 0.07 15,274
Region: Southeast 0.45 0.47 0.95 15,274
Region: South 0.15 0.15 0.00 15,274
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014)
methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel, and heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bandwidths:
R$ 36 for the main group and R$ 32 for birth spacing group. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, central-
ized at R$ 140. Unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico
in 2011 as the head of the family. Difference p-value corresponds to the p-value obtained for γ0 in equation (3).
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Figure A1: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Race: White (b) Race: Black-Brazilian (c) Race: Oriental
(d) Race: Pardo-Brazilian (e) Race: Indigenous (f) Race: Missing
(g) Work: Worked in the last week (h) Work: Missing
(i) Education: None or some primary
education
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A2: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Education: Primary Incomplete
(b) Education: Some High School ed-
ucation (c) Education: High school or higher
(d) Education: Missing (e) Live with spouse (f) Age
(g) Have disabilities (h) Number of Children (i) Birth spacing z-score (2011)
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A3: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Household: Urban (b) Household: Number of rooms (c) Household: Piped water
(d) Household: Piped water (missing
info) (e) Household: Has bathroom
(f) Household: Has bathroom (missing
info)
(g) Water: Supply network (h) Water: Artesian Aquifer (i) Water: Others
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A4: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Water: Missing (b) Wastewater: Sewer system (c) Wastewater: Septic tank
(d) Wastewater: Directly discharged at
water sources (e) Wastewater: Others (f) Wastewater: Missing
(g) Garbage: Collected (h) Garbage: Burned or buried (i) Garbage: Discharged at open air
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A5: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Garbage: Others
(b) Electricity: Electric supply net-
work (c) Electricity: Generators
(d) Electricity: Candles (e) Electricity: Others (f) Electricity: Missing
(g) Income: Receives pension
(h) Income: Receives pension (miss-
ing) (i) Income: Donations
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A6: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Income: Donations (missing)
(b) Income: Unemployment bene-
fits
(c) Income: Unemployment bene-
fits (missing)
(d) Income: other sources than job
related
(e) Income: other sources than job
related (missing) (f) Region: North
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A7: Covariate Balancing - Main group
(a) Region: Northeast (b) Region: Central-West (c) Region: Southeast (d) Region: South
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Dashed
lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family. See table A3 for p-values and No of observations.
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Race: White 0.33 0.35 0.28 2,030
Race: Black-Brazilian 0.10 0.11 0.97 2,030
Race: Oriental 0.01 0.01 0.68 2,030
Race: Pardo-Brazilian 0.56 0.52 0.33 2,030
Race: Indigenous 0.00 0.01 0.32 2,030
Race: Missing 0.00 0.00 0.98 2,030
Work: Worked in the last week 0.32 0.35 0.75 2,030
Work: Missing 0.35 0.27 0.01 2,030
Education: None or some Primary education
(<4yrs of education)
0.09 0.08 0.96 2,030
Education: Primary Incomplete 0.40 0.36 0.32 2,030
Education: Some High School education 0.29 0.28 0.67 2,030
Education: High school or higher 0.21 0.27 0.34 2,030
Education: Missing 0.00 0.01 0.08 2,030
Live with spouse 0.50 0.57 0.83 2,030
Age 26.18 26.38 0.75 2,030
Have disabilities 0.01 0.00 0.34 2,030
Number of Children 1.97 1.89 0.99 2,030
Birth spacing z-score (2011) -0.08 -0.04 0.51 1,092
Household: Urban 0.88 0.87 0.11 2,030
Household: Number of rooms 3.94 4.06 0.22 1,981
Household: Piped water 0.84 0.87 0.55 2,030
Household: Piped water (missing info) 0.02 0.03 0.17 2,030
Household: Have bathroom 0.93 0.94 0.51 2,030
Household: Have bathroom (missing info) 0.02 0.03 0.17 2,030
Water: Supply network 0.79 0.79 0.02 2,030
Water: Artesian Aquifer 0.14 0.16 0.08 2,030
Water: Others 0.05 0.03 0.69 2,030
Water: Missing 0.02 0.03 0.17 2,030
Wastewater: Sewer system 0.55 0.56 0.01 2,030
Wastewater: Septic tank 0.35 0.35 0.10 2,030
Wastewater: Directly discharged at water
sources
0.04 0.03 0.14 2,030
Wastewater: Others 0.01 0.01 0.21 2,030
Wastewater: Missing 0.05 0.05 0.55 2,030
Garbage: Collected 0.83 0.82 0.00 2,030
Garbage: Burned or Buried 0.07 0.07 0.05 2,030
Garbage: Discharged at open air 0.01 0.01 0.13 2,030
Garbage: Others 0.06 0.08 0.02 2,030
Electricity: Electric supply network 0.93 0.94 0.56 2,030
Electricity: Generators 0.00 0.00 0.47 2,030
Electricity: Candles 0.01 0.00 0.32 2,030
Electricity: Others 0.04 0.03 0.56 2,030
Electricity: Missing 0.02 0.03 0.17 2,030
Income: Receive pension 0.14 0.10 0.28 2,030
Income: Receive pension (missing) 0.39 0.33 0.13 2,030
Income: Donations 0.10 0.08 0.42 2,030
Income: Donations (missing) 0.43 0.35 0.02 2,030
Income: Unemployment benefits 0.00 0.01 0.19 2,030
Income: Unemployment benefits missing) 0.43 0.35 0.02 2,030
Income: other sources than job related 0.19 0.13 0.34 2,030
Income: other sources than job related
(missing)
0.29 0.27 0.16 2,030
Region: North 0.11 0.08 0.31 2,030
Region: Northeast 0.23 0.18 0.29 2,030
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Region: Central-West 0.08 0.12 0.53 2,030
Region: Southeast 0.41 0.45 0.59 2,030
Region: South 0.16 0.17 0.52 2,030
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014)
methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel, and heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bandwidths:
R$ 36 for the main group and R$ 32 for birth spacing group. Running variable: 2011 per capita income, central-
ized at R$ 140. Unit of observation: women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico
in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth in the 2012-2015 period. Difference
p-value corresponds to the p-value obtained for γ0 in equation (3).
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Figure A8: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Race: White (b) Race: Black-Brazilian (c) Race: Oriental
(d) Race: Pardo-Brazilian (e) Race: Indigenous (f) Race: Missing
(g) Work: Worked in the last week (h) Work: Missing
(i) Education: None or some primary
education
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A9: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Education: Primary Incomplete
(b) Education: Some High School ed-
ucation (c) Education: High school or higher
(d) Education: Missing (e) Live with spouse (f) Age
(g) Have disabilities (h) Number of Children (i) Birth spacing z-score (2011)
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
51
Figure A10: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Household: Urban (b) Household: Number of rooms (c) Household: Piped water
(d) Household: Piped water (missing
info) (e) Household: Has bathroom
(f) Household: Has bathroom (missing
info)
(g) Water: Supply network (h) Water: Artesian Aquifer (i) Water: Others
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A11: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Water: Missing (b) Wastewater: Sewer system (c) Wastewater: Septic tank
(d) Wastewater: Directly discharged at
water sources (e) Wastewater: Others (f) Wastewater: Missing
(g) Garbage: Collected (h) Garbage: Burned or buried (i) Garbage: Discharged at open air
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A12: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Garbage: Others
(b) Electricity: Electric supply net-
work (c) Electricity: Generators
(d) Electricity: Candles (e) Electricity: Others (f) Electricity: Missing
(g) Income: Receives pension
(h) Income: Receives pension (miss-
ing) (i) Income: Donations
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
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Figure A13: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Income: Donations (missing)
(b) Income: Unemployment bene-
fits
(c) Income: Unemployment bene-
fits (missing)
(d) Income: other sources than job
related
(e) Income: other sources than job
related (missing) (f) Region: North
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
55
Figure A14: Covariate Balancing - Birth spacing group
(a) Region: Northeast (b) Region: Central-West (c) Region: Southeast (d) Region: South
Notes: All regressions follow (3) specification, within the bandwidths calculated by Calonico et al. (2014) methodology, for a 1st order polynomial and uniform kernel. Running
variable: 2011 per capita income, centralized at R$ 140. Dashed lines corresponds to 95% confidence interval, with heteroscedastic-robust errors. Bin size: 1. Unit of observation:
women of 16-44 years of age, with at least one child, entered in Cadúnico in 2011 as the head of the family, conditional on having at least one birth during 2012-2015. See table
A4 for p-values and No of observations.
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Data Appendix












5 Bvar + 2 BVJ - - 236 259
5 Bvar + 1 BVJ - - 198 217
5 Bvar - - 160 175
4 Bvar + 2 BVJ - - 204 224
4 Bvar + 1 BVJ - - 166 182
4Bvar - - 128 140
3 Bvar + 2 BVJs 132 172 172 189
3 Bvar + 1 BVJ 99 134 134 147
3 Bvar 66 96 96 105
2Bvar + 2 BVJs 110 140 140 154
2 Bvar + 1 BVJs 77 102 102 112
2 Bvar 44 64 64 70
1 Bvar + 2 BVJs 88 108 108 119
1 Bvar + 1 BVJ 55 70 70 77
1 Bvar 22 32 32 35
2 BVJ 66 76 76 84
1 BVJ 33 38 38 42
UCT 68 70 70 77
UCT + CCT combinations
UCT + 5 Bvar + 2 BVJ - - 306 329
UCT + 5 Bvar + 1 BVJ - - 268 287
UCT + 5 Bvar - - 230 245
UCT + 4 Bvar + 2 BVJ - - 274 294
UCT + 4 Bvar + 1 BVJ - - 236 252
UCT + 4 Bvar - - 198 210
UCT + 3 Bvar + 2 BVJs 200 242 242 259
UCT + 3 Bvar + 1 BVJ 167 204 204 217
UCT + 3 Bvar 134 166 166 175
UCT + 2Bvar + 2 BVJs 178 210 210 224
UCT + 2 Bvar + 1 BVJs 145 172 172 182
UCT + 2 Bvar 112 134 134 140
UCT + 1 Bvar + 2 BVJs 156 178 178 189
UCT + 1 Bvar + 1 BVJ 123 140 140 147
UCT + 1 Bvar 90 102 102 105
UCT + 2 BVJ 134 146 146 154
UCT + 1 BVJ 101 108 108 112
Notes: Unitary payment values can be found in Table 2. Payment values change dates are set by law, and the
change dates can be found in MDS (2011, 2015). Anyone that received a positive amount in a month is considered
to be a BF beneficiary in said month. If a payment cannot be identified as a combination in the table, the receiver
is still a BF beneficiary, but not a CCT or UCT recipient. Additionally, if a payment is identified more than once,
for example, as CCT and UCT + CCT (i.e., an identity conflict), then the payment is considered as not identified.
The selection process for BF takes an average of four months, so we extended the allocation window of 2011 until
April 2012 - using information on the 2012 Cadúnico - for women that registered between October and December
2011. For instance, women that registered in November and started receiving a BF payment on February 2012 were
considered to be in the treatment group.
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